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Abstract—Mobile payments have increased significantly in
the recent years and one-to-one money transfers are offered by
a wide variety of smartphone applications. These applications
usually support scan-and-pay—a technique that allows a payer
to easily scan the destination address of the payment directly
from the payee’s smartphone screen. This technique is pervasive
because it does not require any particular hardware, only the
camera, which is present on all modern smartphones. However,
in this work we show that a malicious application can exploit
the overlay feature on Android to compromise the integrity of
transactions that make use of the scan-and-pay technique. We
implement Malview, a proof-of-concept malicious application that
runs in the background on the payee’s smartphone and show
that it succeeds in redirecting payments to a malicious wallet.
We analyze the weaknesses of the current defense mechanisms
and discuss possible countermeasures against the attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most mobile applications for one-to-one payments sup-
port the scan-and-pay technique—an easy to use method for
money transfers. This technique consists on the payer scanning
through the mobile’s camera the destination address of the
payment directly from the screen of the payee’s phone. Scan-
and-pay does not require any particular hardware, thus it
has become very pervasive as it is supported by all mod-
ern smartphones. It is featured by official applications of
traditional banks to enhance user’s experience for money
transfer. This technique is also popular among applications
serving as cryptocurrency wallets. Differently from traditional
banks, cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, rely on cryptography
to protect transactions integrity and users’ privacy. Once a
transaction is published to the blockchain it cannot be reverted
or modified [17]. Furthermore, as a pair of public and private
keys are generated for each transaction, transactions do not
give information about the identities of users. In general the
public key is the user’s address and it composed of dozens of
case-sensitive random characters (see Figure 1), which make
it difficult for a payer to type it manually into a mobile device.
The integrity of mobile payments based on scan-and-pay
is threatened by malwares that misuse benign features of the
system. For instance, Android provides any application with
the possibility to show overlays on top of other applications.
An overlay can be created by a foreground application or a
service—an application component performing long-running
operations in the background. The most common ways to
create overlays on Android is through Alert Windows or
Toasts. The former requires that the application is granted
the SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW permission, while the latter
does not require any particular permission. On prior works [1],
[15], [20], [22], [26] overlays have been studied with particular
Fig. 1. Payee’s address QR-code shown on the device screen during a
transaction in Bitcoin Wallet.
reference to their potential to mount UI redressing attacks, e.g.,
clickjacking, or phishing. However, these attacks focus on de-
ceiving the user to commit an unintended action (clickjacking)
or steal sensitive information from the user (phishing), while
we exploit overlays to compromise the information transferred
between two smartphones.
Differently from us, UI redressing attacks employ overlays
mostly for tricking the user into clicking an UI component
that she does not intend to click [1], [5], [15], [20], [26]. For
example, a malware places an overlay with the button “Play”
on top of a sensitive button, i.e., “Call”, of a victim application.
The user sees the button “Play” and taps the screen with the
intention to start a game, but the overlay is configured in
such a way that it does not receive the touch event, therefore
the “Call” button of victim application is clicked. Although
OS offers defense mechanisms, clickjacking still remains an
important problem on Android [22].
On the other side, the goal of phishing is to deceive
users and steal sensitive information (credentials) from victims,
which is orthogonal to our goal. Chen et. al [7] investigates
the information available in the proc folder to infer the state
of the current activity in the foreground and mount phishing
attack at the moment the user expects to enter her credentials.
Approaches like [4], [25] exploit multitasking management
systems or instant app features of Android to achieve phish-
ing attacks. While previous clickjacking and phishing attacks
exploit overlays to deceive the user, we extend the use of
malicious overlays to violate the integrity of mobile payments
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utilizing scan-and-pay technique.
Bianchi et. al [5] present an exhaustive study on the
techniques a malicious application can exploit overlays to
trick the user. They propose an on-device mechanism as
a countermeasure that prints on the system navigation bar
a secure indicator about the identity of the application on
the foreground. Fernandes et al. [9] improve the mechanism
proposed in work [5]. AlJarrah et. al [2] introduce a new
event OnOverlap fired by the system in order to notify the
potential victim application about an ongoing attack. Ren et.
al [24] propose a new security model named Android Window
Integrity (AWI) which protects the user against GUI attacks.
However, most of these defense mechanisms are designed to
prevent only UI redressing or phishing attacks and rely on the
user to detect malicious overlays. As shown in work [5], a
significant number of users do not pay attention to security
indicators, therefore attacks remain still effective.
In this paper we present an attack that employs the over-
lay feature in Android to compromise the integrity of one-
to-one mobile payments. This attack targets mainly wallet
applications for cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin Wallet [12],
among many others. We do not attack the Blockchain protocol
itself but rather the scan-and-pay technique employed by
applications that individuals use as cryptocurrency wallets
on their smartphones. The attack is significant because it
targets a payment method that is very popular and causes
financial damage to victims. In the case of cryptocurrencies,
the importance of the attack increases because it is impossible
to cancel a transaction or get the money back even if the attack
is detected by the users immediately after the payment.
To evaluate the efficacy of our attack, we implement
Malview which runs in the payee’s device. The malicious
behavior of Malview can be hidden as a service of a game
or a repackaged popular application [14]. We configure the
malicious server on a remote machine that hosts the attacker’s
Bitcoin wallet. Our experiments show that Malview is effective
to redirect the payment to a malicious wallet. We show that
the attack works well in practice with a phone connected to
the Internet using either Wifi or cellular connectivity.
However, the implications of the attack are not limited
only to mobile payments. Virtual business card applications
are another use-case. These applications employ QR-codes as
a simple way to transfer contact details of an individual to
another. We describe how Malview can threaten this category
of applications and serve as a starting point for more severe
attacks against users, e.g., phishing, identity theft, or deploying
malicious executable files through emails.
II. BACKGROUND: OVERLAYS IN ANDROID
Smartphones are complex systems and the user interface
is composed of different components. Android employs the
WindowManager Interface [3] to accommodate properly UI
components generated by all entities of the system. Window-
Manager is responsible for managing and generating all the
windows, views, buttons, images, and other floating objects on
the screen. It is accessible from applications on the foreground
or background and it allows them to add or remove overlays on
runtime through its methods: windowmanager.add(view) and
windowmanager.remove(view).
In the attack presented in this work we make use of views
that are placed on top of all the other objects, including the
views of the foreground application. These particular view ob-
jects can be implemented either as Alert Windows or as Toast
Windows [3]. Differently from Toast Views, Alert Windows
are not restricted by the system for how long they stay on
the screen. However, both types of views have a common
feature: When created, even from a service on background,
Android puts them on top of all other objects, including the
foreground application [3]. Alert Windows require that the
application owns the SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW permission
in order to create overlays, while toasts do not require any
special permission. Interestingly, authors in the work [10] show
how a malicious application can misuse Play Store policies
to be granted with SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW permission
even without user approval. However, the permission is very
common among applications on Google Play, as it enriches
the user experience on one application while using another
one, e.g., a music player widget. Facebook Messenger’s “chat
head” feature is based on the attributes of Alert Windows.
A search of the Play market through the IzzyOnDroid online
crawler reveals that there are more than 600 applications
with hundreds of millions of downloads each that require
SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW [16]. Among the very popular
applications (with more than a billion downloads) that use the
same permission for their features are Facebook for mobile,
Skype, the Telegram Messenger, and the Cut the Rope game.
The extensive use of this permission by a large number of
applications shows that this permission is not perceived as
harmful by the users.
III. ATTACKING BITCOIN MOBILE WALLETS
By default, the application of the payee generates a Bitcoin
address of 34 alphanumerical characters associated to the
wallet and unique to the transaction—this is done to make
the transaction unlinkable to other transactions of the same
wallet. The very same feature, however, can be exploited by
MalView to steal the coins of a transaction: The money leaves
the payer, never reaches the payee, and goes to a malicious
and anonymous wallet. In terms of usability, a user cannot
remember her address because it is not static and changes
after each transaction, also it is not easy for a sender to type
manually the long random string of the receiver’s address,
therefore QR-codes offer a soft experience.
All mobile bitcoin wallets employing QR-code based pay-
ments operate in a similar way (see Fig 1). As a proof of
concept of our attack, we have implemented it for the Bitcoin
Wallet app [12], the most widely used by bitcoiners worldwide
(1M–5M installs on Google Play alone) and recommended by
the Bitcoin project official homepage bitcoin.org.
IV. ADVERSARY MODEL
We consider a scenario where the attacker controls an app
installed on the user’s device, similarly to the assumption
in [7], [18], [25], [28], [29], with a malicious functionality
hidden in a repackege [14] of a legit application.The goal is
to violate the integrity of QR-code based mobile payments
without being detected. The malware has access to just two
permissions: The SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW, very common
in popular applications, and the INTERNET permission—with
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TABLE I. SPECS OF THE DEVICES USED IN THE TESTBED.
Brand & OS CPU RAM
Motorola Moto G (Android 4.4.4) Quad-core 1.2 GHz Cortex-A7 1GB
Galaxy Note 3 Neo (Android 4.4.2) Quad-core 1.3 GHz A7 & dual-core 1.7 GHz A15 2GB
Galaxy Note Pro 12.2 (Android 5.0.2) 1.9GHz Exynos 5 Octa 3GB
PROTECTION NORMAL protection level on Android [3].
This indicates that it is considered not harmful and that it is
granted to all apps that require it without asking the user.
V. THE ATTACK IN DETAILS
After a mobile wallet application, for example the Bitcoin
Wallet, is installed on the device, the application pre-generates
the QR-code corresponding to the address to be used in the
next transaction. Then, during a QR-based transaction where
the sender specifies the amount to be transferred, the parties
proceed as follows: The payee loads the QR-code on the
device’s screen by clicking on the apposite button, pictured
as a miniature version of the code (see Figure 1). The sender
uses the app’s integrated scanner to scan the payee’s QR-code
from which the payee’s address is extracted. Then, the sender
specifies the amount of coins to be sent and taps Send, to com-
mit the transaction to the Bitcoin Network for validation [19].
At this point, the payee receives a confirm notification with
the transaction details (amount of coins transferred, the payer’s
address, the time and date of the transaction).
The attack targets users that are the recipients of a transac-
tion, and its goal is to steal the bitcoins destined to the victim’s
wallet. The idea is to stealthy transform transactions towards
the victim into transactions towards another wallet controlled
by the attacker; neither the sender nor the receiver notice
the attack. In our setup, the Bitcoin Wallet of the attacker
executes on a the malicious server. When MalView is installed
on the victim’s device, it pulls from the server the attacker’s
address to be used in the next transaction. The attack begins
after the target application is started by the victim. Therefore,
MalView should be able to correctly detect this event in the
victim’s device. Malview can utilize known techniques [5],
[7] to detect when the target application is in foreground, in
our prototype we make use of /proc/<pid>/cgroup file. The
malicious application can even trigger system reboot [13] to
guarantee that the application starts in its main activity.
When the user starts the Bitcoin Wallet
application, MalView exploits the granted permission
SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW to create a transparent malicious
overlay on top of the button that loads the legit QR-code on
the screen. At the moment the payee clicks in the application
to show her address as a QR-code to the payer, the click goes
actually to the Malview. The legitimate application does not
receive any event and cannot detect that an attack is taking
place. In order for the QR-code to look legitimate to the
payer and the payee we use the same code as the legitimate
application to generate it. Our target mobile wallet application
is open source [6] and we use the original code to generate
the same views that show the payee’s address in the victim
application. In case that another targeted application is not
open source, the adversary can replicate the same design
manually also. Therefore, when the unaware victim (the
payee) taps the button to load the QR-code of her address
on the screen, the event is caught by MalView which loads
another QR-code: The one coming from the malicious server.
At this point, the transaction that starts from the sender
actually arrives on the adversary’s wallet. However, in order
to keep the attack hidden, the malware on payee’s device
tries to trick the user that the payment was successful by
mimicking notifications of the honest application.
After the transaction is validated by the Bitcoin Net-
work, the attacker’s wallet receives the corresponding notifi-
cation, extracts its details, and sends them to the MalView
application—its counterpart on the victim’s (payee) device.
The Android OS allows any application to show fully cus-
tomized notifications. MalView exploits this feature and adds
the details of the transaction received from the server to create
a fake notification on the victim’s device. This notification
is generated on purpose with the icon and the styling of the
real Bitcoin Wallet application notification, which makes it
indistinguishable from a legit one for the user. As a result, both
the sender and the receiver are left unaware of the attack and
fooled to believe that the coin transfer went through correctly.
Note that, for the attack to go undetected, MalView needs
to know how the Bitcoin Wallet application visualizes the QR-
code and the miniature QR-code button on the given victim
device. The way an application displays its components on
a device is peculiar to the device type, model, and screen
resolution, freely accessible on Android through public APIs of
the WindowManager Interface [3]. Then, MalView generates
the corresponding parameters regarding the visualization of the
Bitcoin Wallet components, and stores them locally in the form
of an XML file to be used when needed.
A. Toasts
In our first proof-of-concept implementation of Malvew
we exploited the SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW permission to
generate the malicious view that shows the fake QR-code on
top of the legitimate one. However, a further investigation
showed that Malview can be implemented in an alternative way
through APIs and functionalities publicly accessible in An-
droid and without requiring the SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW
or any other permission at all. Here we describe the details.
Any application in background or foreground can generate
notifications or quick messages regarding some aspect of the
system through the Toast class. The window that shows the
volume control while the user is tuning the device’s volume is
one example of Toast messages. Their purpose is to show some
information to the user in a non-intrusive way, therefore they
can be employed by any service or user application without
requiring any special permission from the user. However,
Android does not restrict the design of such messages and one
application can fully customize Toasts views to contain images
or other objects. Most importantly, Toasts are always shown on
top of any other window, including the foreground application,
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Fig. 2. Average and standard deviation of the attack setup time and responsiveness (notification arrival time) under different types of connectivity. The setup
time is measured from when the user clicks on the Bitcoin Wallet application’s icon to when the fake QR-code is shown on screen.
just like Alert Windows. Therefore, an adversary can employ
Toasts to develop malicious apps that do not require any special
permission from the user as discussed in other works [5], [20].
We implemented a version of Malview using Toast Win-
dows instead of Alert Windows as a proof-of-concept applica-
tion. Given that Android limits the time that a Toast stays on
screen to just a few seconds, it becomes problematic for the
malware to keep the QR-code on the screen for a longer time.
The counterfeit QR-code should be on top of the legitimate
one until the payer scans it in order to direct the payment to
attacker’s wallet. Therefore, Malview exploits the Toast class
and periodically calls the toast.show() method of the malicious
view before it expires. In this way the new version of Malview
has the same functionalities and performs the same attack
without the SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW permission.
VI. THE BITCOIN WALLET ATTACK: EXPERIMENTS
Here we present the results regarding the coin-stealing
attack with the Bitcoin Wallet app. The malicious server was
deployed on a MacBook Pro machine with a 2.8 GHz Intel
Core i5 processor and 8 GB of RAM. For the evaluation we
used two Samsung Galaxy Note devices and a Motorola Moto
G smartphone (see Table I). The experiments consisted on
sets of 30 QR-code based payments. Each set of payments
was performed with and without MalView’s presence on the
victim (payee’s) device. Finally, for the experiments we used
both WiFi and cellular connectivity (4G for the two Samsung
devices and 3G with the Motorola Moto G device).
A. Attack setup time
When the victim (payee) opens the Bitcoin Wallet appli-
cation to start a transaction, MalView starts generating the
transparent malicious view that covers the miniature legit QR-
code button. This setup phase should complete before the user
taps the button to load the QR-code address for the transaction;
otherwise, MalView will not be able to capture the tap and load
the adversary’s QR-code accordingly. The result presented in
Figure 2(a) show that MalView is extremely efficient in setting
up the attack. Indeed, the average setup time on all devices
is less than a second. This guarantees that the malware will
seamlessly and stealthily operate to load the adversary’s QR-
code on the victim’s screen on time.
B. Responsiveness
After the transaction is submitted by the payer and vali-
dated by the Bitcoin Network, the device of the payee receives
a notification. When the attack is in place, the actual recipient
is the adversary. Thus, the notification is received by the
malicious server hosting her wallet. Then, the transaction
information is forwarded to the MalView application residing
on the victim’s device so that it can create and show the fake
transaction notification. Clearly, this man-in-the-middle attack
incurs some delay in the reception of the notification and, if
the delay is high, the users may get alerted. To assess the delay
we measure the time interval from when the payer confirms the
transaction, till when the fake transaction notification is shown
on the victim’s device, and compare it with the time interval
in a normal transaction. The results are shown in Figure 2. We
observe that the delay overhead of MalView with respect to
the regular application is quite low (around 500 ms).
VII. OTHER USE-CASES
The attack described in this paper does not concern only
cryptocurrency wallet apps in Android. In fact, it targets a large
number of other apps, including e.g. online banking, whose
prototype implementation we describe here.
A. Banking Applications
Mobile payments are spreading rapidly, they are highly per-
vasive, and countries are moving toward cashless economies.
A large currency ban applied by the Indian government forced
the indian people to switch to mobile wallets in order to pay
for their daily goods and services [11]. Paytm [21] is one very
popular wallet app in India with more than 100M installations.
The Paytm app features the scan-and-pay technique in a same
way as the Bitcoin wallet app: The payee shows the QR-code
that encodes his address (see Figure 3(a)) and the payer scans
it and then send the money. Therefore, it is just as vulnerable
to our attack as the Bitcoin Wallet one.
Postepay [23], the app of the Italian postal and financial
services provider, is another mobile application with more
than 5M installs that feature the same scan-and-pay tech-
nique through QR-code for person-to-person payments (see
Figure 3(b)). We modify Malview and implement another
proof-of-concept malware that targets Postepay. Similarly to its
first version, Malview runs in the background and it monitors
information in the proc folder to track the user interaction
with the foreground app [7]. Once the victim navigates to the
activity that shows the QR-code with his address the malware
adds an overlay with the address of the attacker. Postepay app
allows the user to also store her QR-code in the photo gallery
for simplicity in the future. We find this method insecure as any
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(a) The Paytm app. (b) The PostePay app.
Fig. 3. Screenshot of two mobile apps employing scan-and-pay through
QR-code to read the address of the payee.
malicious apps with access to users’ photos can overwrite the
QR-code with a fake one. Differently from Bitcoin apps, the
Postepay app shows a summary page to the payer that contains
the nickname of the payee, e.g., m.rossi. At this point the
payer should make sure that the nickname corresponds to the
real payer. But, if the attacker sets his nickname using simple
visually deceptive text techniques—the malicious nickname is
similar to the one of the victim—there is a probability for the
payer to miss the difference as shown in other works [8].
B. Virtual Business Cards
Even though the capacity of a QR-code to store data is
limited to a few Kilobits, it is still an optimal approach on
some particular scenarios like virtual business cards (vCards),
that store all contact information of a professional. vCards
can be embedded in QR-codes so to easily create a phone
contact entry by just reading the QR-code. The code can be
printed on a paper business card or it can simply be shown
on the screen of a smartphone. App stores for both Android
and iOS offer many free applications that decode different
types of QR-codes, including vCards. However, the integrity
of the QR-code can be compromised when scanned from a
smartphone screen if a malware is running on the system. As
shown our Bitcoin Wallet application attack, the malware can
place a malicious QR-code on top of the original one. Although
the type of data stored on the QR-code is limited to contact
details, an adversary can use this attack as a starting point for
more dangerous threats. For instance, the contact details can
include a URL to a malicious site that tricks the user to enter
credentials or download a malware. A targeted attack would
help the adversary to impersonate the victim to others, i.e.,
commit identity theft.
C. Denial of Service
On some particular scenarios Malview cannot simply re-
place the original QR-code with a bogus one and go un-
detected. For example, one bank application can allow its
users to exchange money with each other through scan-and-
pay technique only if both parties are registered customers of
Fig. 4. A screenshot of the attack countermeasure: The system-level framing
with yellow and black stripes of alert windows.
the bank. From the technical perspective Malview can attack
this application but the adversary risks to be easily exposed.
If the fraudulent transaction is noticed either by the payer
or the payee, the bank has the required information to track
the adversary. Therefore, in this scenario the adversary is not
interested on stealing the money directly. However, sometimes
it is beneficial to cause denial of service to his victims by
placing an invalid QR-code on the screen, or the QR-code of
an innocent third party to cause confusion. In case the malware
is installed on the smartphone of a cashier in a shop it would
cause problems by preventing customers to pay as usual.
VIII. COUNTERMEASURES
The attack presented in this paper has a direct financial
impact on the victims as it steals money from users and for-
wards it to a malicious wallet. Although the attack technique is
similar to UI redressing, it has several characteristics that make
possible defense mechanisms challenging. In this section we
discuss possible approaches that can serve as countermeasures
to our attack.
A. Using the Touch Filtering Specific in Android
Android provides applications with a defense mechanism
to prevent clickjacking attacks. The idea of this protection is
to preserve the integrity of the application interface when the
user clicks a particular button. The touch filtering mechanism
is disabled by default, but developers can enable it for a given
view object. When enabled for a specific view, the system will
discard all clicks (touch events) issued over areas of the view
obscured by another service’s window, thus the view will not
get any touch event. Therefore, this mechanism thwarts only
attacks that make use of “passive” overlays—visible labels
or images to the user, but do not get touch events [5], [20].
However, the touch filtering based mechanism is useless in
our attack where the overlay is active and it prevents the
foreground application from receiving touch events.
B. Making Background service Views Easy to Recognize
One possible way to mitigate the attack is to modify, at the
Android OS system level, the appearance of views generated
by a background service so to make them easily recognizable
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TABLE II. DEMOGRAPHICS OF EXPERIMENT PARTICIPANTS.
Age Gender Android users Total
20-25 25-30 30-35 M F Yes No
78 10 2 49 41 50 40 90
by the user by restricting their styling. We modified the
Android OS so to impose all such view components to have
a well-distinguishable frame-box or texture pattern, or both.
In addition, the system also enforces overlay views adhere to
this specific style, and forbid it for any other view type. This
way, even transparent views like the ones Malview makes use
of become recognisable by the user, as shown in Figure 4.
To evaluate the effectiveness of this defense mechanism
we recruited 90 participants for a user study in a university
campus and organized an in-person interview (see Table II).
The participants were presented with a Samsung Galaxy S5
device running our modified version of the Android OS. We
have installed the Malview malware on the device, running
in the background. Participants were guided to open the
Bitcoin Wallet application and play the role of a receiver in
the transaction. When the QR-code is loaded, users see the
framebox imposed by the system as in Figure 4.
In the end of the interviews we asked participants for their
comments regarding the black and yellow stripes around the
QR-code. We learned that it was not straightforward for all the
users to relate this to security concerns. The user study shows
that 36% of the participants did not get alerted of an ongoing
attack even with the countermeasure in place, as demonstrated
in Figure 4. This result shows that if such countermeasure is
implemented in Android, users should be trained to understand
how overlays work and therefore how to be protected.
Ethical Considerations. The experiments were carried out
by lending to each of the volunteers our own devices. At no
point did we require participants to use their own devices or
provide any private or sensitive information like usernames,
passwords or private keys.
C. One-time Codes
Some mobile payment applications require the sender to
type a one-time password (OTP) to confirm the transaction. For
instance, Paytm [21] sends a text message with an OTP code
to the payer’s phone number. This solution harms the goals of
Bitcoin and does not offer the proper protection. Bitcoin is a
decentralized system and transactions should not depend on a
single or limited number of entities such as telecom networks.
In addition, to deliver the OTP through SMS the network
should be able to link the sender’s wallet with the respective
phone number. However, the OTP does not protect against the
presented attack because the code is not descriptive of the
transaction and the payer would type it normally thinking she
is confirming the transaction to the genuine receiver.
D. Sensitive Views
Previous works [22], [27] present the concept of “sensitive”
views that allow developers to protect a specific component of
their application. This feature protects legitimate applications
against UI redressing attacks because it forces any overlay
created by another application (e.g., a background service) to
move outside of the area of the sensitive view. This defense
scheme mitigates the attack and it does neither change the user
experience, nor place the burden to the user. However, applica-
tion developers are responsible to mark properly the sensitive
views of their wallet applications that show the QR-codes in
order to inform the system that particular components should
be protected. Then, the system would prevent any malicious
service trying to load an overlay with a counterfeit QR-code
representing the address of the adversary on top of the original
one. Furthermore, mobile applications are typically updated
to include new features or adapt the application to the new
hardware, therefore, even if new UI redressing attacks are seen
in the wild, the developers have the opportunity to increase
their protection through sensitive views. This approach can be
easily integrated in the current applications serving as wallets
of cryptocurrencies or other mobile payments based on the
scan-and-pay (e.g., QR-codes) technology.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we show how the scan-and-pay method can
be exploited by malicious applications to steal the transaction
ammount in mobile payments of e-coins. We target Bitcoin
wallet applications that support payments based on QR-codes.
The goal of the attack is to steal transaction coins directed to
the payee’s wallet when the QR-codes is scanned. We exploit
features of the Android OS that allow any background service
to show overlays on top of the foreground application. Our
prototype application makes use of these overlays to achieve
the goal of stealing the transaction amount in a stealthy way—
without nor the payer neither the payee understanding what is
actually going on. Our experiments show that the attack is fast
and efficient. Lastly, we discuss other use-cases of the attack
and possible countermeasures to prevent it.
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